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David Freedman’s impressive paper reveals well his deep understanding of not only statistical 
techniques and their uses but also of scientific methodology and its philosophy. On visits to 
Berkeley over the years, I have had the opportunity to talk with David and to learn much from 
our  friendly  and  constructive  conversations.  He  was  a  great  member  of  the  intellectual 
community and his passing is a huge loss to us all. 
 
In particular, I would have enjoyed discussing his paper, “Limits of Econometrics” with him, 
especially his final sentence, “The goal of empirical research is---or should be---to increase 
our understanding of the phenomena, rather than displaying our mastery of technique.” Also, 
in his wide ranging discussion, he has identified crucial obstacles to progress in several areas 
of social science research, including econometrics. The overall message conveyed reflects his 
fruitful and productive life. It questions commonly accepted methodologies and makes a plea 
for  the  development  of  alternatives  more  solidly  grounded  in  data,  appropriate  statistical 
methods and scientific methodology. In particular, Freedman has stressed the difficulties of 
verifying  many  assumptions  made  in  regression  analyses  and  the  impact  that  incorrect 
assumptions can have on the validity of conclusions, one general important theme of his 
research. In this regard, I can identify deeply with his point of view since I too have been 
engaged in developing sound alternatives to conventional methods that are often based on 
weak foundations and lead to unsatisfactory results.  
  
In what follows, I shall attempt to respond to some of the fundamental issues raised by David 
by discussing a number of principles and procedures that I believe are important in promoting 
progress  in  understanding,  predicting  and  possibly  controlling  phenomena  in  all  areas  of 
research. First, note that Karl Pearson’s (1938) “Unity of Science Principle,” namely that any 
area of study, be it physics, astronomy, economics, political science, etc., can be scientific if 
scientific methods are employed in producing, analyzing and learning from data. Now it may 
be asked, “Where can one learn about the methodology of science?” In this regard, I, and 
many  others,  recommend  highly  Sir  Harold  Jeffreys’  (1998)  classic  book,  Theory  of 
Probability, that first appeared in 1939 with many subsequent editions, the last appearing in 
the  Oxford  U.  Press  Classics  Series,  1998.  Note  that  the  well  known mathematician  and 
statistician,  I.  J.  Good  wrote,  “In  my  review  (Good,  1962)  I  said  that  Jeffreys’  book  on 
probability “is of greater importance for the philosophy of science and obviously of greater 
immediate  practical  importance,  than  nearly  all  the  books  on  probability  written  by 
professional  philosophers  lumped  together.”  I  believe  that  this  is  still  true,  though  more 
professional philosophers have woken up.” (quote from Zellner (1989:32); see also reviews of 
Jeffreys’ work by S. Geisser (1989) and D.V.  Lindley  (1989), in this  volume). Also, the 
recent paper, “Harold Jeffreys’ Theory of Probability Revisited,” by Robert et al. (2008) to 
appear in Statistical Science with discussion presents a chapter by chapter review of Jeffreys’ 
book and concludes that it is indeed a classic work. Note that Jeffreys, along with many other 
physical scientist use the term “probability theory” rather than “statistics” to denote the area 
of work in which measurements are made and used to describe phenomena and to evaluate 
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because they do not like the word “statistics” according to some because Lord Rutherford, a 
famous  physicist,  is  remembered  as  saying,  if  you  need  statistics  to  analyze  your  data, 
redesign your experiment. 
 
Briefly, Jeffreys’ work is fundamentally important because it was undertaken to provide a 
fruitful framework for scientific research not only for the physical sciences but also for all 
areas  of  study,  including  the  biological  sciences  and  social  sciences,  about  which  David 
Freedman is so concerned. Some points that emerge from Jeffreys’ and others’ works that 
appear very important are: 
 
1.  Formal Learning Model: In analyzing and learning from data, be it regression or other 
data, it is important to use a good, explicit learning model. As has been pointed out 
many times in the literature, many researchers do not use a formal learning model and 
thus learn informally. Bayesians use, and sometimes misuse, Bayes’ Theorem as a 
formal learning model that has been logically justified in several different ways and 
shown to work well in many estimation, testing, prediction and other studies; see for 
example the many empirical examples in Jeffreys’ book and many Bayesian texts (a 
listing  of  texts  is  available  at  http://www.bayesian.org,  the  homepage  of  the 
International Society for Bayesian Analysis). 
  
2.  Simplicity Postulate: Simpler models will probably work better in explanation and 
prediction. See Jeffreys (1998:4 and 47) and Zellner et al. (2001) for discussions of the 
concept  of  simplicity,  measures  of  simplicity,  and  the  results  of  a  poll  of  Nobel 
Economic Prize winners that showed that almost all of them favored a “sophisticatedly 
simple”  approach  in  modeling  rather  than  complicated  approaches.  Note  that  it  is 
important the models be “sophisticatedly” simple because some simple models are 
stupid. As regards examples of relatively simple models that have worked well in 
economics and econometrics, there are Marshallian demand and supply models that 
have been widely used world-wide for many years to analyze the operation of product 
and  factor  markets.  Also  there  is  the  recent  formulation  of  Marshallian 
Macroeconomic Models, implemented with disaggregated data, that are a synthesis of 
relatively  simple  disaggregated  Marshallian  industrial  models  and  elements  of 
macroeconomic theory to form large, but relatively simple, models that explain and 
predict fairly well and can be used for analyzing alternative policies; see, e.g. Zellner 
and Chen (2001), Zellner and Israilevich (2005) and Ngoie and Zellner (2008).  
  
3.  Predictive  testing  of  models  is  central  in  science,  as  is  well  known  but  not 
implemented enough in empirical work. Also, as noted in my invited review paper on 
concepts of causality, published in Zellner (1979), eds. K. Brunner and A.H. Meltzer, 
the famous philosopher of science, Herbert Feigl (1953) presented a critical review of 
concepts of causality in the literature and concluded that the following definition is 
most appropriate and useful: “The clarified (purified) concept of causation is defined 
in terms of “predictability according to a law (or more adequately according to a set of 
laws).” (p. 408). In view of the central role of prediction in the definition of causation 
and in many other areas, it is regrettable that many statistical analysts do not check the 
predictive  performance  of  their  models.  Indeed  in  terms  of  the  exchange  between 
Keynes  and Tinbergen  on econometric models’ performance that  David Freedman 
discussed in his paper, it is noteworthy that Christ (1951) did compare and discuss the 
predictive performance of one of Klein’s macro econometric models vis a vis that of a Zellner-Comments on “Limits of Econometrics” by David Freedman 
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benchmark random walk model and found that it did not perform very well and thus, 
as Milton Friedman noted in his discussion, needed reformulation. 
 
4.  Since “laws” are fundamental in defining causality and in other respects, as David 
Freedman recognizes, a fundamental issue is how do we produce laws, e.g., Newton’s 
and Einstein’s laws, Marshall’s laws of demand and supply, etc. ? In my work over the 
years, I have suggested, in accord with Hadamard’s (1945) findings, that generation of 
more  unusual  and  surprising  facts,  some  contradicting  old  laws  and  beliefs,  will 
probably inspire many to generate new theories to explain the unusual facts that can 
then  be  tested  with  much  new  data.  For  further  discussion  of  this  process  and 
information about eight ways to produce unusual facts, see Zellner (1984:9-10).  
  
5.  One class of unusual facts that Franz Palm and I have emphasized in our theoretical 
and empirical work, summarized in Zellner and Palm (2004) is that often some purely 
statistical univariate and multivariate time series models, e.g. Box-Jenkins ARIMA or 
transfer  function  models  or  variants  of  statistical  multivariate  time  series  models 
forecast future outcomes, e.g. the next period real GDP growth rate, reasonably well. 
In  our  structural  econometric,  time  series  analysis  (SEMTSA)  approach,  we  use 
economic theory to formulate “causal” multivariate dynamic economic models that 
mathematically imply the statistical model that forecasts reasonably well. Thus, using 
our methodology, we produce causal models, e.g. our Marshallian Model, mentioned 
above. Or if we have a causal time series econometric model, we check it using time 
series model identification and diagnostic testing procedures in efforts to improve its 
performance  in  explanation,  prediction  and  policy-making.  See  Zellner  and  Palm 
(2004) for further discussion of these procedures and applications. 
 
6.  Last, there is the issue of which statistical inference procedures to use in estimation, 
testing, prediction, model combining, decision-making, etc. Over the years, much of 
my research has been directed at evaluating the comparative performance of Bayesian 
and non-Bayesian procedures and I have concluded that Bayesian procedures have 
performed better. This is not to say that Bayesian procedures are perfect and indeed in 
Zellner  (1988)  a  new  information  theoretic  derivation  of  Bayes’  theorem  and 
discussions of it by Jaynes, Kullback, Hill and Bernardo, are provided. In more recent 
research,  using  the  approach  in  Zellner  (1988)  that  produced  Bayes’  theorem,  by 
varying the conditions  of the optimization problem, new, optimal learning models 
have been derived. By having a broader range of optimal learning models on the self, 
some that do not require use of a prior distribution, statisticians and other scientists 
will become more effective in learning from data and solving inference and decision 
problems.  
 
7.  In summary, thanks to David Freedman for giving us such a stimulating paper, his 
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